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IN DEFENSE OF HYBRID REPRESENTATION: THE SWORD TO
WIELD AND THE SHIELD TO PROTECT
Kelly Rondinelli*
The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is in a court-
room . . . .1
INTRODUCTION
Hiding from view behind a concrete sign and wearing top-to-toe black clothing,
Brandon Colbert waited.2 Time passed, yet Colbert still waited.3 Eventually, he saw
them: Carina Mancera, Luis Anya (her boyfriend), and their daughter Jenabel.4 Colbert
stepped out from behind the sign, leveled his shotgun and fired, killing Carina “almost
instantly.”5 Jenabel, fated to follow in her mother’s footsteps, died at the hospital a
short while later.6 Only Anya escaped unharmed, but in a matter of a few short hours,
he was left devastated by the loss of his family.7
Investigators linked Colbert to the crime via DNA found on the shotgun shell, and
he was later charged with murder and attempted murder.8 In May 2017, Judge Jess
Rodriquez pronounced Colbert incompetent to stand trial, ordering him to be admitted
to a state hospital for treatment.9 Yet, in a strange turn of events, just five months later,
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1 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 253 (1960).
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Judge Rodriquez ruled Colbert competent to stand trial.10 Somewhat more surprisingly,
Judge Rodriquez also ruled that Colbert was competent enough to act as his own attor-
ney.11 This decision was all the more extraordinary given that it followed a series of
bizarre court hearings over the course of the previous year, with Colbert denying in-
volvement in the shootings and raising conspiracy theories as his means of defense.12
In fact, Colbert claimed his victims were still alive and that he had been framed.13
This recent example highlights merely one of the many problems courts face
when a pro se litigant stands before them, particularly a pro se defendant.14 As a result
of the decision in Faretta v. California,15 defendants have a constitutional right to
represent themselves without the assistance of counsel.16 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, offered little guidance on how this right would work in practice, leaving in
its aftermath chaos at the trial level.17 As Joshua L. Howard put it:
In the wake of Faretta, the trial courts have been left with a myr-
iad of problems stemming from self-representation including a
defendant’s lack of substantive knowledge, a defendant’s lack of
procedural and evidentiary expertise, potential for disrupted court-
rooms, and an increased need for judicial assistance in securing
the rights of pro se defendants.18
This leads to one central question: how is the judiciary to balance the constitutional





14 See Jona Goldschmidt, Autonomy and “Gray-Area” Pro Se Defendants: Ensuring Com-
petence to Guarantee Freedom, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 130, 130 (2011) (“One of the funda-
mental questions facing American criminal courts is: what should be done with those persons
who are legally competent to stand trial and who assert their constitutional right to represent
themselves, but who have both a lack of legal knowledge and skill, and mental or emotional
problems that limit their ability to represent themselves?”). For an interesting take on the diffi-
culties pro se litigants present, see Jessica K. Phillips, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created
Equally: Examining the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens Of
The Sovereign Citizen Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221 (2016). Phillips’s article
explores the idea that pro se litigants should be classified into distinct groups to help lessen the
burden on the judicial system. Id.
15 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
16 Id. at 836.
17 John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assess-
ment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST.
L. J. 483, 485 (1996) (“As a consequence of Faretta there are ‘trials’ in courts throughout the
country that make a mockery of justice and disrupt courtroom procedure.”).
18 Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let’s Clear the Air
for the Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 854 (2001).
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of the judicial system, the right to a fair trial, and the constitutional protections
afforded to the very same defendant?
While grappling with an answer to this question, one must consider the underly-
ing motive behind a defendant’s choice to proceed pro se at all, especially when the
assistance of counsel is offered. One way to think about this is to imagine a court-
room. A courtroom is viewed from a myriad of perspectives: the judge, the jury, the
lawyers, the deputies, the victim, the defendant.19 Looking from the bench affords
a very different view to that of looking toward the bench. For a defendant, the court-
room can be an intimidating place: “[I]t is a theater in which the various . . . actors
play out the guilt or innocence of the defendant for the trier of fact to assess.”20 At
the center of the stage is the defendant himself; he is observed, studied, judged.21
Every move the defendant makes can impact the outcome of the day.22
In stark contrast to everyone else present, the defendant finds himself in a power-
less position.23 The procedures of the courtroom are—arguably—stacked against
him. The prosecution usually has greater wealth, experience, and human resources.24
The jury is, more often than not, comprised of persons different from the defen-
dant’s socioeconomic and racial background.25 A “defendant walks into a courtroom
where most, if not all, of the players presume that he has committed a crime. Al-
though the law states that defendants are to be presumed innocent, the applicability
of that presumption is questionable.”26
In reality, this powerlessness—or perhaps the feeling of powerlessness—is not new
to the defendant. Poverty is a common factor among defendants.27 Nor is this a new
development: “At every point in the history of criminal justice, the people arrested,
prosecuted, and punished have been mainly the poor and the powerless.”28 In 2015,
19 See STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 21 (2005) (discussing the various difficulties defendants face in the
courtroom).
20 Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 573, 573 (2008).
21 Id. at 575 (“While a defendant sits in court, exercising his Sixth Amendment right to con-
front the witnesses against him, he is at center stage and on display for the jury. Jurors scrutinize
his every move, attaching deep importance to a quick glance or a passing remark . . . .”).
22 Id. at 576 (“The impression that the defendant makes on the jury can thus have an
enormous impact on the outcome of the trial.”).
23 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim’s Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant,




27 See generally Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the
Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/3MGM-Q8YY].
28 SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8
(1998).
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prior to their incarceration, prisoners had a median annual income of $19,185.29 This
was forty-one percent less than people of the same age who were not incarcerated.30
Racial disparity also plays its part: in 2014, those who identified as African Americans
“constituted 2.3 million, or 34%, of the total 6.8 million correctional population.”31
African Americans are also far more likely to be incarcerated—five times more likely
than those who identify as Caucasian.32 When faced with such realities, perhaps there
is little wonder that many defendants choose to go it alone. Why change the habit
of a lifetime?
Returning to the central question posited earlier, this Note suggests that hybrid
representation is a potential workable solution to the judiciary in reaching that all-
important balance between the constitutional rights of the pro se defendant and the
competing demands of the judicial system. As defined in more detail below, hybrid
representation is both representation and self-representation at the same time—a
“co-counsel” approach.33 A court can use this model as a shield to protect against the
inherent problems of pro se defendants, while also providing a sword to that very
same defendant to face the challenges of the judiciary. In “arming” both sides, better
advocacy and better outcomes are a more likely result.
Part I of this Note briefly examines the evolution of the Sixth Amendment and
the right to self-representation, surveying the Faretta decision to include both the
majority and the dissenting opinions. Part II explores how hybrid representation is
a potential sword for the serious pro se defendant to wield against the charges brought
against him. More generally in this section, I consider the advantages of such a model.
Part III examines the opposite side of the adversarial process: how the court can use
hybrid representation as a shield against the pro se defendant who chooses to disrupt
the court to, for example, propound bizarre theories or delay the judicial process by
superfluous briefs, motions, and filings. Here, more generally, I note the potential pro-
tective measures of hybrid representation. Finally, Part IV offers potential consider-
ations federal judges should acknowledge when faced with a defendant who wishes
to proceed using hybrid representation.34
29 Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 27.
30 Id.
31 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/7B66-FAUA] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). The U.S. Department of Justice
breaks down this 6.8 million into those in jail and prison—2.2. million—and those who are either
on probation or parole—4.5 million. See Lauren E. Glaze & Danielle Kaeble, Correctional
Populations in the United States, 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST., NCJ 248479 (Dec. 2014), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7DN-3VJG].
32 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 31.
33 Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin On Its Edge,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 74 (2003).
34 This Note only considers hybrid representation as a means for indigent defendants, not
non-indigent defendants who, due to their income status, do not qualify for court-appointed
counsel. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE
RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution reads in part that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.”35 This wording seems absolute, straightforward, and irrefutable.36
But Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests the very opposite: the understanding of
the Sixth Amendment has developed, grown, and changed over the years.37 In fact,
the Court has adopted both “expansive and constrictive conceptions of the right to
counsel” at different times in its history, thereby demonstrating a continual tension
that exists within the Amendment itself.38
Beginning at a decisive moment, in the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright,39 the
Court held that the assistance of counsel was a fundamental right and enforceable
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Just twelve years later, in Faretta
v. California,41 the Court declared that the right to self-representation was also a funda-
mental right for all criminal defendants, if they voluntarily and intelligently elected
to do so.42
The Faretta Court’s analysis was thorough, with the majority detailing the history
and right to self-representation back to its English roots.43 The majority “posited that
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36 But see Note, “A Prison is a Prison is a Prison”: Mandatory Immigration Detention
and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 129 HARV. L. REV. 522, 522 (2015) (highlighting
“longstanding Supreme Court precedent . . . [that] criminal defendants are not entitled to
invoke Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel . . . [for] minor charges that do
not carry the threat of jail time”).
37 See id.
38 Id. at 525 (quoting Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 585, 599 (2011)).
39 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40 Id. at 342 (“We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that
a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was
wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of
these fundamental rights.”). The Court also reaffirmed the essential right to counsel in America:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards de-
signed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every de-
fendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.
41 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
42 Decker, supra note 17, at 492.
43 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821.
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although the Sixth Amendment does not expressly grant the right to self-representation,
it is necessarily ‘implied’ by the amendment’s ‘structure.’”44 Further, the Court found
that counsel could not be forced upon a defendant who wanted to self-represent.45
By doing so, a court would violate the language of the Sixth Amendment, particu-
larly in its use of the word “assistance.”46
The majority supported its holding with the fundamental notions of freedom and
personal choice.47 The Court noted that because it was the defendant who would
bear the “personal consequences of a conviction,” it was his choice as to whether
agreeing to counsel would be an advantage or not.48 Continuing on, the Court stated
“[a]nd although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment,
his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the life-
blood of the law.’”49
The Faretta decision was not unanimous. Chief Justice Burger dissented alongside
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.50 The Chief Justice began with the premise that
“there is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, even the most
uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his own defense to criminal
charges.”51 Countering the majority’s expression of freedom and personal choice, he
focused on the idea that even a skilled and knowledgeable defendant would face con-
viction because of his lack of legal understanding and inability of knowing how to
prove his innocence.52 Chief Justice Burger continued: “[i]f th[is] be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect.”53 He finished by highlighting the impact of the majority’s holding on the
44 Decker, supra note 17, at 494 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819).
45 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
46 Id. (“The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the
other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not
an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself
personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the
logic of the Amendment.”).
47 Id. at 834.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 836, 846 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 836 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 838 (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left with-
out the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incom-
petent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))).
53 Id. at 839.
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criminal justice system, noting that the congestion of the courts would only increase
and, as a result, the “quality of justice” would suffer.54
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun expounded further upon Chief Justice Burger’s
remarks but ended by commenting on the procedural problems that the majority’s
decision would cause.55 He listed several questions that he felt the majority had left
open, including the question of when a defendant actually needed to decide whether
he would proceed pro se or not, as well as whether a defendant could switch his choice
mid-trial.56 To finish, Justice Blackmun wrote what has become a most infamous
line: “If there be any truth to the old proverb that ‘one who is his own lawyer has a
fool for a client,’ the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right
on one to make a fool of himself.”57
Many of the concerns of the dissenting Justices appear to have come to fruition
since the Faretta decision in 1975.58 More importantly, however, it has become clear
that the Faretta decision, when combined with Gideon, actually leaves criminal de-
fendants with a far more serious dilemma: the “absolute choice . . . between self-
representation or representation by counsel.”59 As the Connecticut Supreme Court put
it: “[t]he right to counsel and the right to self-representation present mutually exclusive
alternatives. A criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected interest in each, but
since the two rights cannot be executed simultaneously, a defendant must choose
between them.”60
Perhaps the Connecticut Supreme Court was a little stringent in its evaluation.
There is a middle ground between the two exclusive alternatives: the first of these
is standby counsel; a second is hybrid representation.61 Often, the boundary between
54 Id. at 845.
55 Id. at 846 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent.
56 Id. at 852.
57 Id.
58 Notably, the Justices’ concerns are present in our society for many more reasons than
criminal defendants proceeding pro se. For the current status of the federal judiciary’s caseload,
see UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2017), http://www
.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2017 [https://perma.cc/5H4B
-NLHU] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
59 W. Michael Greene, Note, Criminal Law—Hybrid Representation—An Accused Has
No Constitutional Right in Texas to Representation Partially Pro Se and Partially by Counsel,
9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 328 (1977).
60 State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 13 (2012).
61 See Howard, supra note 18, at 852 (“Still, pro se representation’s long history of creating
difficulties has prompted courts across the country to devise creative measures such as standby
counsel and hybrid representation to handle these problems.”); see also Colquitt, supra note 33,
at 63 (“[H]ybrid representation [i]s a viable middle ground between representation by counsel
and self-representation.”). Cf. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal
Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676 (2000). In her
article, Poulin focuses on standby counsel, but she offers an interesting note applicable to the
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these two middle-ground alternatives is blurred both by courts and critics alike, further
problematizing an already troubled area of trial practice.62 But, if a clear delineation
between these two options was elucidated, criminal defendants would be afforded
two further choices in their decision of how to proceed. Moreover, courts would be
afforded a further option to prescribe: hybrid representation. Additionally, when
considering the Faretta opinions—the majority and the dissents—hybrid representation
addresses many of the concerns noted. For example, while maintaining the freedom
of personal choice (as the majority focuses on), the defendant is not left to bungle
his own defense because he has the aid of counsel (a concern of the dissenters).
Many may assert that the latter part of this example is resolved by that of standby
counsel. Acknowledging the problems that some criminal defendants present in their
deliberate disruption of courtroom proceedings, the Faretta Court noted that: “a
State may—even over objection by the accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid
the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent
the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-representation is
necessary.”63 However, standby counsel is a rather bleak middle ground with many
significant problems of its own.64
Hybrid representation, in contrast, differs considerably from standby counsel; as
noted above, it is both representation by counsel and self-representation simultane-
ously.65 It is the sharing of activities between counsel and the defendant.66 “[I]t con-
stitutes a ‘co-counsel’ model which involves actual assistance of the attorney in the
trial process. . . . [I]n hybrid cases, the accused and the attorney share the role of
counsel, although the defendant may well take the lead in the case.”67 The difference
to standby counsel, then, is what counsel is permitted to do: as standby counsel, a
lawyer is not allowed to actively represent the defendant; in a hybrid representation
relationship, counsel can participate in opening and closing arguments, jury selection,
examination of witnesses, and other parts of the trial process too.68
Unfortunately, the modern-day opinion of hybrid representation is less than fa-
vorable: it is “neither required by law nor favored by courts.”69 Some critics concede
discussion here: “[C]ases reveal that self-representation tends to drift toward a hybrid
representation, which both amplifies the ambiguity of standby counsel’s role and signals the
defendant’s discomfort with pro se representation.” Id. at 687.
62 See Jona Goldschmidt, Judging the Effectiveness of Standby Counsel: Are They Phone
Psychics? Theatrical Understudies? Or Both?, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 133, 139 (detail-
ing the proposition that both “advisory” and “hybrid” designations should be eliminated due
to the confusion and error introduced into the concept of standby counsel).
63 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834–35 n.46 (1975).
64 See, e.g., infra notes 103, 108–09.
65 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 74.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 74–75 (internal citations omitted).
68 Id. at 75.
69 Id. at 58.
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that it is a creative solution to the problem that pro se defendants present, but then
go on to discredit the model as causing more problems than it portends to solve.70
Others, although admittedly few, consider it as a valid alternative to standby counsel
and something that should be available to criminal defendants.71 Hybrid representa-
tion, while “not constitutionally guaranteed . . . is constitutionally permissible.”72
Ultimately, however, it is left to the trial court’s discretion whether to make such an
option available.73
Although not a perfect answer, the duality of hybrid representation as both a
sword and shield entitles this alternative to a more positive and understanding
reception. As a sword, a defendant can wield the model in pursuit of his cause;74 as
a shield, a court can maintain justice and order.
II. A DEFENDANT’S WEAPON OF CHOICE: THE SWORD OF HYBRID REPRESENTATION
Thus far, the states have varied in their treatment of hybrid representation.75
Texas, for example, has explicitly held that there is no constitutional right to hybrid
representation.76 It is not alone; courts across America have uniformly rejected it.77
However, there are a few lone stars who have allowed some form of the model in
their courtrooms.78 Alongside the several advantages of the model—such as “fairness,
efficiency, and even the efficacy of the trial process”79—hybrid representation should
not be dismissed out of hand just yet.
70 Howard, supra note 18, at 852.
71 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 127.
72 Decker, supra note 17, at 539.
73 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 76, 77 (“Federal judges can, and sometimes do, permit hybrid
representation. Generally, the issue is left to the discretion of federal trial judges.”).
74 Cf. Meghan H. Morgan, Standby Me: Self-Representation and Standby Counsel in a
Capital Case, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 367 (2004). Morgan notes that proponents of the use of hybrid
representation argue that the jury is presented with a “humanized pro se defendant who
would otherwise not have taken the stand.” Id. at 378. This is a powerful draw to the sword
for a defendant.
75 See J. Allison DeFoor II & Glen H. Mitchell, Hybrid Representation: An Analysis of
a Criminal Defendant’s Right to Participate as Co-Counsel at Trial, 10 STETSON L. REV.
191, 197 (1981).
76 Greene, supra note 59, at 323. Other states have also held the same, such as Pennsylvania.
See, e.g., Brittaney N. Eshbach, The Interplay of Pro Se Defendants, Standby Counsel, and
Ineffective Assistance of Standby Counsel Claims: An Examination of Current Law and a Sug-
gestion for Reform in Pennsylvania, 121 PENN. L. REV. 875, 897 (2017).
77 See Goldschmidt, supra note 14, at 170; see also Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md.
1987) (“There can be but one captain of the ship, and it is he alone who must assume responsi-
bility for its passage, whether it safely reaches the destination charted or founders on a reef.”).
78 See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
79 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 58.
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In United States v. Kimmel,80 the Ninth Circuit found the district court below
had the authority to allow a hybrid form of representation.81 James Kimmel, appeal-
ing his convictions for distribution and the conspiracy to distribute drugs, elected to
proceed pro se.82 The trial court, however, provided standby counsel to assist Kimmel
in building his defense.83 Mr. Bronson, the advisor, performed more than the tra-
ditional functions of standby counsel; he “counsel[ed] Kimmel on technical points,
he actively argued before the district court and, by the end of the proceedings,
emerged as the dominant spokesman for the defense.”84 The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that Mr. Bronson had not “assumed all the duties of a full-fledged counsel.”85
For example, Kimmel presented his own defense theory questioning the court’s
jurisdiction by arguing that he was a citizen of the sovereign nation of Hawaii.86
On appeal, the Government argued that there was no need for Kimmel to formally
waive counsel because in this case, the joining of the lawyer and the defense ensured
“the accused receive[d] all the benefits of representation . . . .”87 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed.88 As long as the defendant waived counsel by the Faretta requirements,
he could proceed with a “hybrid” form of standby-counsel.89 The court opined: “The
district court has the authority to allow, if the accused desires, a hybrid form of
representation in which the accused assumes some of the lawyer’s functions . . . .”90
However, the Ninth Circuit went on to state that, although they questioned “the effi-
ciency of hybrid arrangements, [it is] the district court [that] suffers the major
inconvenience and can usually best weigh the costs and benefits.”91
80 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982).





86 Id. For further discussion on sovereign citizen theories expounded by many defendants
see Francis X. Sullivan, The “Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional Authority”: The Legal Theo-
ries of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785. Sullivan provides an extended
description of the Sovereign Citizen movement to include its history and the current legal ar-
guments it propounds in the courtroom. See also James Erickson Evans, Note, The “Flesh
and Blood” Defense, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1361 (2012).
87 Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721.
88 Id. (holding that because Kimmel had a constitutional right “to have his own lawyer
perform core functions,” he had to “knowingly and intelligently waive that right”).
89 Kenneth R. Sogabe, Note, Exercising the Right to Self-Representation in United States
v. Farhad: Issues in Waiving a Criminal Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 147 (2000) (discussing United States v. Kimmel in his note and
exploring the effect of the Sixth Amendment’s right to waive counsel on a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right to a fair trial).
90 Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721.
91 Id.
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United States v. Kimmel demonstrates that a hybrid form of representation, of
some kind, is permissible in some courts.92 The case also shows a defendant’s desire
to exert some control over the litigation process.93 This is a result of the power
imbalance both within the courtroom and the judicial process that the defendant
wishes to fight against.94 It is this desire that often leaves a defendant stuck for choice
when choosing whether to go it alone or opt for counsel, the latter often a court-
appointed attorney.95
Hybrid representation thereby provides an advantageous option to the defendant.96
This is particularly the case when a pro se defendant wishes to use the courtroom as
a means of actually defending the claims against him, rather than propound incom-
prehensible theories or disrupt judicial proceedings.97 Several advantages present
themselves: first, that the defendant often knows the facts of the case better than
anyone else; second, that the model can be viewed as a form of compromise; and third,
that it could actually lead to better outcomes.
A. The Defendant’s Knowledge
The defendant often knows the facts of the case better than anyone else in the
courtroom.98 As a result, he is the best positioned to present those facts at trial.99
Admittedly, this same advantage is present if a defendant chooses to proceed pro
se;100 however, in such a situation, any advantage is diminished by his lack of legal
knowledge. In utilizing hybrid representation instead, the defendant maintains, if not
bolsters, his advantage; the co-counsel attorney can step in where familiarity with
92 Id.; Marc C. McAllister, Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing and Faretta: Reaffirming Counsel’s
Vital Role When Defendants Manipulate Competing Sixth Amendment Representation Rights,
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1227, 1235–36 (2016).
93 See Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721.
94 See supra notes 19–32 and accompanying text.
95 See Greene, supra note 59, at 332–33.
96 Howard, supra note 18, at 862. Courts also benefit from hybrid representation. See
infra Part III.
97 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 14, at 1222 (exploring pro se litigants, particularly Sovereign
Citizens, who use the courtroom as a “forum of protest”). Although discussing pro se litigants,
many of Phillips’s ideas are applicable to pro se defendants.
98 Howard, supra note 18, at 862.
99 Id. See also Colquitt, supra note 33, at 121 (“Special circumstances may also make hybrid
representation the better choice for some defendants. Such circumstances arise, for example,
when a defendant has special knowledge that may better qualify the defendant to conduct
particular portions of the trial. . . . [I]n Faretta, the Supreme Court conceded that ‘it is not
inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more
effectively by conducting his own defense.’” (internal citations omitted)).
100 Howard, supra note 18, at 863.
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court procedures, the rules of evidence, or substantive elements of the law are
required.101 Because of this combined approach, the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to present his knowledge of the facts in the appropriate way and within
the rules.102
One could argue that this advantage is also provided by standby counsel. However,
as seen in Kimmel, courts are struggling to define just how far standby counsel can
be involved before they impinge upon a defendant’s right to self-representation.103
Hybrid representation can work around this struggle by clearly delineating from the
outset what role the co-counsel will play and what role the defendant will play.104
A judge could easily prescribe such boundaries.105
A further rebuttal propounded against the advantage of a defendant proceeding
via a hybrid representation model is that the use of this option only leads to confusion,
ultimately proving detrimental to the defendant himself.106 Marie Williams com-
ments that hybrid representation confuses both the judge and the jury.107 She notes
that a judge “is [left] uncertain [as to] how much he should permit standby counsel
to participate, knowing that too much interference by standby counsel could result
in an overturned conviction.”108 Furthermore, it is the jury who is the most vulnera-
ble to confusion by the hybrid representation model:
Very few jurors realize that a defendant has a right to represent
himself, nor do they understand the role of standby counsel. Not
knowing what exactly is going on, other than that the trial seems
to be a confusing mess, it is highly likely that a jury will draw a
negative inference against the defendant from the fact that he is
presenting parts of his own case.109
Williams raises valid concerns. But she also admits that her example of McKaskle
v. Wiggins,110 which she relies on, does not use the term “hybrid representation.”111
101 Marie Higgins Williams, Comment, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel,
and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 805 (2000).
102 Id. (“Such advice helps the defendant exercise his right of self-representation more
effectively and begins to level the playing field in the courtroom.”). Williams discusses this
benefit to defendants who are appointed with standby counsel, but the argument holds equal
weight when considered in light of hybrid representation.
103 See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).
104 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 108–09.
105 See id.




110 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
111 Williams, supra note 101, at 808 n.115.
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Instead, the case shows how “the interaction between the defendant and standby coun-
sel is a prime example of how problematic hybrid representation can be.”112
There is room to disagree. Indeed, the proper implementation of hybrid represen-
tation may very well soothe the worries Williams presents. For example, a judge faces
the potential for an overturned conviction when he appoints standby counsel, whether
the attorney interferes too much or too little.113 By allowing hybrid representation,
the court can clearly delineate the attorney’s role and the defendant’s role, reducing
the potential for an appeal based on such interference or lack thereof. Moreover, a
judge can explain hybrid representation to a jury, thereby resolving most, if not all
confusion surrounding the model.114 We place significant faith in juries—their role
provides one of the fundamental foundations of our legal justice system.115 It is thus
more than fair to presume that juries are capable of understanding the concept of
hybrid representation.
B. A Means of Compromise
The middle ground between the two Sixth Amendment extremes of the right to
counsel and the right to self-representation is hazy at best. Hybrid representation can
help clear the fog. “A defendant may be aware of what he loses when he chooses to
proceed pro se, but he might prefer that loss over the complete surrender of control.
Hybrid representation thus allows the defendant to compromise.”116
A rebuttal to this argument for compromise is that it is not for the court to “fulfill
every desire of the defendant, especially one that has the potential to create confu-
sion.”117 Joshua notes that the judicial system, in particular the trial courts, provide a
structural framework of courtroom proceedings that the defendant must work within.118
His argument has merit, but it also reduces the rights of the defendant—rights that
are clearly respected by the Supreme Court decisions this very discussion is based on.119
112 Id.
113 See Goldschmidt, supra note 62, at 133.
114 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 114.
115 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 U. COLO.
L. REV. 233, 233 (2013) (discussing how “[j]uries are central to the constitutional structure
of America” and the value of educating jurors about the role they play within the civic world
to inspire increased engagement).
116 Howard, supra note 18, at 862.
117 Id. at 863. Howard raises supporting arguments for hybrid representation but then later
posits rebuttals, such as the above, to show how hybrid representation is not persuasive overall.
Id. at 859–65.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (commenting that a defendant’s
“choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law’” (internal citations omitted)).
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Furthermore, it is within the trial court’s discretion to permit hybrid representation.120
The judicial system allows for such a choice within the structural framework that it
provides courts to follow.
Hybrid representation fulfills the advantage of compromise for the defendant as
its provides a balance—both the defendant and the attorney can choose a mutually
agreed point along the spectrum of involvement.121 Additionally, the compromise
allows a defendant to pull back some control—or power—over his defense within
the courtroom.122 As a result, a defendant may be deterred from disruption.
C. A Working System
Another advantage of allowing pro se defendants to wield the sword of hybrid
representation is that it may actually create a system that works. The current system
leaves much to be desired—“[t]he legal system we have created for pro se defendants
is inherently contradictory and fails to achieve any of its stated goals.”123 One critic
goes so far as to say that the right of defendants to proceed pro se is actually a right
to “crash and burn.”124
Paradoxically, however, the fact that pro se defendants, and pro se litigants gener-
ally are highly unlikely to win their cases does not seem to act as a deterrent. Instead,
pro se cases take up a large amount of docket space. For example, at the appellate level,
“[a]ppeals by pro se litigants . . . constituted 51 percent of filings. . . .”125 Additionally,
“[f]orty-six percent of all filings by pro se litigants were prisoner petitioners. Eighty-
nine percent of the 13,900 prisoner petitions received were filed pro se, as were 84
percent of original proceedings and miscellaneous applications. . . .”126
In addition to this is the court’s distaste for pro se cases. Some attorneys and
judges consider pro se litigants and defendants “as aberrations to the norm . . . .”127
They view them as “a nuisance in need of reform or removal.”128 However, as a result
120 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 102.
121 See Judith Welcom, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 B.U.
L. REV. 570, 570 (1977).
122 Id. The defendant has control of both the means of representation and the presentation
of his defense. Id.
123 See Jonathan Wood, Persuasion, Paternalism, or Withdrawal: The Ethical Obligations
to the Religious Wishes of Nidal Malik Hasan, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 967, 985 (2014).
124 See Tiffany Frigenti, Flying Solo Without a License: The Right of Pro Se Defendants
to Crash and Burn, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1019 (2012).
125 U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2015, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2015 [https://perma.cc/62M2-2WBB]
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
126 Id.
127 Phillips, supra note 14, at 1227.
128 Id. at 1221.
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of the Faretta decision,129 proceeding pro se is now an integral part of the justice
system, no matter what issues it may present.130 Hybrid representation could be the
helping hand needed under the current circumstances.
Alongside the advantages considered above, there are undoubtedly more. What is
demonstrated, however, is that hybrid representation has the potential to be used effec-
tively, particularly by defendants who wish to maintain some control and strike the
right balance between their two Sixth Amendment rights. Furthermore, hybrid represen-
tation provides a potential solution to the difficulties pro se litigants and, surprisingly,
standby counsel, present. Although it can be used as a sword, hybrid representation
can also shield the court. It is to this angle that the following discussion now turns.
III. HYBRID REPRESENTATION AS A SHIELD: THE COURT’S
WAY OF PROTECTING ITSELF
In the case of Brandon Colbert,131 Judge Rodriquez ultimately found Brandon
Colbert mentally competent to stand trial and act as his own attorney.132 Although
faced with Colbert’s background of mental and emotional issues, Judge Rodriquez
had no choice but to allow the defendant to assert his constitutional right to self-
represent after waiving the right to counsel “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently.”133 It is in these situations that a court could adopt hybrid representation as
a shield, protecting both the judicial process and defendants themselves.134 In light
of what hybrid representation offers as a safeguard, it becomes more obvious that
such a solution holds real practical possibilities in the courtroom.
A. Defeating Changing Minds
One way a court can use hybrid representation as a source of protection is when
a defendant is particularly capricious. One of the shortcomings of the Faretta
decision was that it failed to determine the course of action to take when faced with
a defendant who fails to choose between counsel or self-representation.135 This
129 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).
130 Howard, supra note 18, at 873.
131 See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
132 Queally, supra note 8.
133 Williams, supra note 101, at 805; Queally, supra note 8.
134 See Williams, supra note 101, at 805–06 (commenting that the imposition of standby
counsel in a situation where the defendant is of “questionable mental . . . fortitude” allows
a judge to ensure a fair trial). Many of Williams’s arguments for standby counsel are equally
applicable to hybrid representation.
135 See McAllister, supra note 92, at 1235; see also United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642,
649 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he right to self-representation is inescapably in tension with the right to
counsel. This is so because invocation of the former ‘poses a peculiar problem: it requires that
the defendant waive his right to counsel.’” (quoting Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1028 (4th
Cir. 1995))).
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prevarication has serious implications for the Court, particularly in consideration of
the Speedy Trial Act.136 Moreover, those defendants who do not make the choice are
often difficult, unruly, disruptive in nature, and in some extreme cases, physically
violent towards others in the courtroom.137
There are a multitude of reasons why a defendant chooses to proceed pro se,
ranging from a lack of respect for the court to defiant acts as a means of getting their
way.138 These issues are only further exacerbated by the “insurmountable barriers”
a pro se defendant faces.139 For example, pro se defendants are unlikely to under-
stand the pleas that may be available to them against the charges they face.140 They
may not know the elements of the crime that they need to try and disprove, or com-
prehend the severity of the possible punishment they face.141
In such cases, it is common for the trial judge to either step in and offer guidance,
or in the other extreme, do nothing at all.142 The latter can pose a significant problem,
but courts consistently state that such defendants “should receive no greater rights or
privileges than counsel would have representing him.”143 The judge should be im-
partial and not provide assistance to the defendant who elected to proceed pro se.144
This lack of involvement can lead to a whole host of evidentiary and procedural errors
by the defendant.145 A trial judge’s involvement, however, also poses difficulties par-
ticularly because of the importance that “the defendant and the prosecuting attorney
both have an impartial tribunal before which they can present their cases.”146 A judge
needs to “avoid . . . conflicts of interest that may arise if he is supposed to make
decisions neutrally while simultaneously informing the defendant of the law.”147
136 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (2012) (“In any case involving a defendant charged with an offense,
the appropriate judicial officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall, after consultation with
the counsel for the defendant and the attorney for the Government, set the case for trial on a day
certain, or list it for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at a place within the
judicial district, so as to assure a speedy trial.”); McAllister, supra note 92, at 1229.
137 See, e.g., United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 240 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Upon seeing
Gardner [assigned counsel] in the courtroom, Leggett lunged at his attorney and punched him
in the head, knocking him to the ground. While Gardner lay, supine, Leggett straddled him
and began to choke, scratch and spit on him. . . . Gardner was taken to a hospital by emergency
medical personnel and treated for cuts, scratches and bruises.”). Leggett’s conviction and
sentence were upheld and he was found to have forfeited his right to counsel at sentencing
due to his physical attack on Gardner. Id.
138 Decker, supra note 17, at 485.
139 Greene, supra note 59, at 332.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. See also Paul Marcus, The Faretta Principle: Self Representation Versus the Right
to Counsel, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 551, 569 (1982) (Supp. 1981).
143 Marcus, supra note 142, at 569 (internal citation omitted).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Williams, supra note 101, at 806.
147 Id.
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Some legal professionals, such as Professor Marc McAllister, have suggested
solutions to such obstructionist behavior, proposing that “a court faced with an unruly
defendant should . . . be permitted to make a factual finding that the defendant is in-
tentionally refusing to make a clear choice between the right to counsel and the right
to self-representation.”148 As a consequence of this finding, the court has, within its
discretion, “to make the Sixth Amendment election for the defendant, which should
ordinarily be representation by counsel.”149 This argument is persuasive. It presents
a potential solution to the issue of the judge’s involvement in the trial. But what if
the defendant had the option to work as co-counsel? Could the court use this as a
shield to protect itself from difficult defendants?
Hybrid representation also provides a solution to unruly defendants, judges’ assis-
tance in trials, and the numerous hurdles pro se litigants face. Concentrating on the last
of these issues, a co-counsel could explain the procedural and evidentiary rules as well
as explain the substantive nature of the charges.150 This would reduce the risk of im-
partiality (and involvement) by the judge too.151 As Williams notes, these advantages
are also present in the use of standby counsel.152 This is not a disagreeable proposition
at all, as many claims that apply to the advantages of hybrid representation are also true
of standby counsel. However, perhaps the biggest positive benefit of hybrid representa-
tion is the potential reduction it could have of disruptive and unruly defendants because
of the choice they have been offered—to work alongside an attorney as co-counsel.153
B. Maintaining a Court’s Control
A second use of hybrid representation as a shield is that it can ensure the court
maintains control.154 The idea of control has been considered as an argument against
hybrid representation: “When counsel are involved, docket and trial administration are
easier; pro se cases make docket and trial management more difficult; and, in the view
of many appellate courts, hybrid cases place even greater demands on trial judges.”155
However, if considering the inverse of this negative viewpoint of hybrid representa-
tion, there is an argument that in the long run, a court will have more control.156
148 McAllister, supra note 92, at 1231.
149 Id.
150 Williams, supra note 101, at 806.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 142, at 572 (“Yet, it is not clear that the use of the defendant
in part of the trial (perhaps in arguments and in confronting a few witnesses) and the use of
an attorney in the same trial (perhaps in making motions and examining other witnesses and
making objections) would necessarily be disruptive.”).
154 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 103–04.
155 Id. at 103.
156 See id. at 104.
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Firstly, a court could use hybrid representation as a pre-emptive strike, removing
the possibility of delays that a pro se defendant could attempt in the courtroom.157
This, in turn, encourages “efficiency and order.”158 Second, the court, in a hybrid
representation relationship, actually exerts a reasonable level of control over the
attorney, who has a certain level of “control” over the defendant too.159 Third, the
court can shield against those defendants who later in the trial change their mind and
no longer wish to proceed pro se: by having hybrid representation, the court could
turn to the attorney in the co-counsel relationship to continue forth with minimal
disruption to the case.160 Finally, a court’s control through the use of hybrid representa-
tion can extend beyond the courtroom, reducing the demands on court personnel
who are often faced with legally incomprehensible documentation from pro se de-
fendants.161 By allowing an attorney to act as co-counsel, they could help the defendant,
or act on their behalf, to produce legally accurate, legible, and understandable briefs,
motions, and so on.162
Several rebuttal arguments are put forth to demonstrate that hybrid representa-
tion results in chaos and courtroom disorder, rather than control.163 For example,
John Pearson asserts that “[c]lashes are likely between counsel and client over the
division of roles. Simply to decide these disputes in [the] defendant’s favor does not
resolve the problem, since the disputes are themselves disruptive.”164 A further
argument is propounded by Joshua Howard, who also frames the idea of chaos in
relation to the attorney-client relationship and the assumptions underlying the legal
profession.165 He posits that the major problem of hybrid representation is the “risk
of clashing wills, putting both the attorney and the client in an unfamiliar relation-
ship.”166 He argues that, in a typical situation, the lawyer is in charge, directing the
legal representation of his client and ultimately telling the client what they should
say and do.167 In a hybrid representation relationship, this is not the case—“an attorney
157 Williams, supra note 101, at 805. Again, Williams argues that a trial court’s appointment
of standby counsel could be considered a pre-emptive strike, but her argument is equally ap-
plicable to that of hybrid representation. See id.
158 Joanne Williams, Slobodan Milosevic and the Guarantee of Self-Representation, 32
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 553, 600 (2007).
159 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 104. By control over the defendant, I refer to the attorney’s
superior legal knowledge of evidentiary and procedural rules, alongside the counsel’s standing
within the courtroom arena.
160 Id. at 107.
161 See Wood, supra note 123, at 983.
162 Id.
163 John H. Pearson, Comment, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants:
Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 716 (1984).
164 Id.
165 Howard, supra note 18, at 859–60.
166 Id. at 861.
167 Id. at 860.
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will not so easily change . . . . This will likely result in the defendant’s taking second
chair to the typical attorney’s theory of defense and strategy direction.”168
Howard is correct in noting that, in a hybrid representation arrangement, an attor-
ney is acting in an unfamiliar role alongside the defendant.169 However, it is not a role
completely unbeknown—many attorneys regularly work with co-counsel and act in
this capacity.170 And many of the advantages mentioned above outweigh the time
spent in delineating the roles between defendant and counsel.171
C. Mitigating Mistrust in the System
A third means of using hybrid representation as a shield focuses on mitigating
a defendant’s mistrust of the judicial system and of his counsel.172 As discussed
earlier, the current status of many jurisdictions is the either/or rule: a defendant has
the choice of counsel or the choice to self-represent, but there is no middle
ground.173 But as Judith Welcom points out, this “imposition of an either/or reflects
an institutional desire for clearly defined rules rather than a concern for the dignity
and needs of the defendant.”174 This lack of concern is perhaps what leads, among
other things, to a defendant’s mistrust and disdain for the judicial system and the
counsel imposed by the court.175 Consequently, many defendants proceed pro se
rather than with counsel.176
An indigent defendant is most vulnerable to mistrust. If he does elect to have
counsel, he has no choice but to rely on the court-appointed attorney or the public
defender assigned to his case.177 These attorneys are unknown to the defendant, and
due to the increasing demands of their work, they are often overburdened.178 From
a defendant’s point of view this is less than ideal, as many believe a lack of prepara-
tion of the attorney due to time pressures impinges upon their right to a fair trial.179
168 Id. at 860–61.
169 Id. at 861.
170 Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Co-Counsel: Joint Venturers or
Scorpions in a Bottle?, 98 KY. L.J. 461, 462 (“Co-counsel relationships between attorneys in dif-
ferent law firms are quite common. . . . Lawyers asked by clients to handle cases in foreign juris-
dictions affiliate with local counsel and those relationships often become reciprocal. . . . Lawyers
who lack experience or expertise in some aspect of the law may align with specialized co-counsel
or veteran practitioners to achieve competence while preserving client relationships.”).
171 See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
172 Welcom, supra note 121, at 585.
173 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 57–58; Howard, supra note 18, at 852.
174 Welcom, supra note 121, at 585.
175 Id.
176 See Howard, supra note 18, at 862.
177 DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 75, at 220.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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Furthermore, as J. Allison DeFoor II and Glenn H. Mitchell note, there is a “strong
institutional pressure[ ] on defense attorneys to cooperate with the prosecutor’s
office in order to process their heavy caseloads.”180 This does not inspire confidence
in the defendant who is led to the conclusion that his case received little attention
and “may even [have] be[en] compromised through plea bargaining.”181 To the de-
fendant in such a situation, the court-appointed attorney or public defender does not
seem on his side at all, but rather simply “an extension of the prosecutor’s office.”182
If a defendant does feel this way, he is left with the option to proceed pro se (or with
standby counsel)—a daunting prospect when he lacks the legal knowledge and
understanding of the judicial process.183
In his discretion, a trial judge can use hybrid representation to combat the
defendant’s distrust and avoid the inherent problems with proceeding pro se.184
“Thus, the hybrid representation model not only improves the acceptability of the
legal process to society through preservation of orderly, accurate determination of
guilt, but also renders the process more acceptable to the defendant himself.”185
D. Promoting Justice
Finally, the shield of hybrid representation can be used as a means of upholding
notions of justice. In his dissent in Faretta, Chief Justice Burger commented that
both the prosecution and the trial judge are “charged with the duty of insuring that
justice, in the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial.”186
Further, Chief Justice Burger posited that such a “goal is ill-served, and the integrity
of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is
obtained due to the defendant’s ill-advised decision to waive counsel.”187
Although Chief Justice Burger was writing in dissent, many of his fears have
come to fruition in allowing defendants to proceed pro se. There are, however, further
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 220–21.
183 Phillips, supra note 14, at 1228 (discussing that pro se litigants cause a backlog as they
attempt “to navigate the procedural and substantive complexities of the judicial system and
the law”). The same idea is applicable to pro se defendants.
184 DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 75, at 222. Again, the authors speak in terms of standby
counsel. Also note, if the defendant does not wish to proceed with hybrid representation, he
is well within his right to inform the trial judge of this decision. This is all the more so given
that hybrid representation is not currently an option provided in many jurisdictions. It is within
the trial judge’s discretion, however, to implement hybrid representation if the defendant wishes
to proceed pro se and has a history of being difficult in the courtroom. That would seem a
fair and common ground for both the judicial system and the defendant.
185 Welcom, supra note 121, at 585.
186 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
187 Id.
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considerations of justice that come to light. As an example: “[W]hen the Court
establishes a system . . . where a client is forced to have an attorney that may be
adverse to his interests, we have created a judicial system that violates the text of the
Model Rules, especially 1.2 and 1.9.”188 Ethics and professionalism are inherently
bound to the notion of justice. As can be seen from the prior discussion, proceeding
pro se or with unwanted standby-counsel, the very underpinnings of the criminal
justice system are called into question.
Thus, alongside the sword-like qualities of hybrid representation for a defendant
to utilize, there are several shield-like protections courts can put into place. This
means of fortification not only holds in favor of the court but also the defendant, en-
suring the latter’s mistrust of the judicial system is somewhat soothed. Hybrid rep-
resentation thus begins to bridge the gap between the justice system and the society
it serves.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HYBRID REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTROOM:
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES TO JUDGES
In his article exploring the ethical obligations counsel face in adhering to the
religious wishes of their clients, Jonathan Wood comments on hybrid representation
as an alternative solution to this difficult area.189 Drawing on Canada’s approach,
Wood notes that hybrid representation allows a defendant to escape the ever-increasing
paternalism of counsel and courts.190 He explains that the model Canada offers al-
lows the litigant (or defendant in our case) to make “his own moral and strategic
decisions, yet still gain the ‘visible hand’ of expertise . . . without the pressure of a
lawyer’s imputed decision-making based on fear of appeal or bar sanctions.”191 Wood
proffers that Canada’s embrace of hybrid representation has proved a most “excel-
lent alternative” to the standard ideas of legal representation—that of counsel or no
counsel.192 He goes on to argue that the adoption of hybrid representation “would
not violate a textualist reading of the current American ethical norms.”193 Furthermore,
“the standard argument of procedural justice having to be rigorously applied would
hold little weight as access to legal assistance would become more widespread and
tailored to the individual needs of the defendant.”194
Wood’s article and his description of Canada’s approach to hybrid representa-
tion provides a way in which to consider how this would work in practice. As a
188 Wood, supra note 123, at 972.
189 Id. at 980.
190 Id. at 980–81.
191 Id. Canada’s system of hybrid representation is one “in which a volunteer lawyer or asso-
ciation of lawyers can be considered ‘on duty’ to consult with pro se litigants on a daily basis.”
Id. at 980.
192 Id. at 982–83.
193 Id. at 984.
194 Id.
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means of resolving the tension left in the wake of Gideon and Faretta, the use of hybrid
representation in the courtroom must ensure a balance between the defendant’s right
to self-representation and other factors to include ideas of justice, fairness, and ju-
dicial efficiency.
A. Does This Court’s Jurisdiction Recognize Hybrid Representation?
A few jurisdictions within the United States recognize hybrid representation as
a potential procedure within the courtroom.195 For example, the Tennessee Supreme
Court in State v. Franklin196 expanded an earlier test to allow hybrid representation
if six conditions were met by the defendant.197 The first of these conditions focused
on ensuring the defendant was not seeking to disrupt the trial by asking for and ul-
timately utilizing hybrid representation.198 Moreover, the second condition centered
on the defendant’s “intelligence, ability and general competence to participate in his
own defense.”199 The remaining four conditions covered a range of points:
[B]ut the trial court must also ensure (3) that the circumstances
are so exceptional as to justify the defendant’s request, which
circumstances must be made to appear on the record, (4) that
defendant has the opportunity to confer with counsel out of the
presence of the jury prior to his participation, (5) that, out of the
presence of the jury, the defendant is instructed that he may not
state facts not in evidence, and (6) that the defendant and the jury
are instructed that the defendant is acting as his own counsel and
that the defendant is not giving any evidence or testimony.200
Many of the factors the Tennessee Supreme Court takes into account address several
concerns that have been put forth by opponents to hybrid representation.201
Tiffany Frigenti, in her article discussing pro se defendants, posits that “there are
‘several well-adhered-to rules’” regarding hybrid representation.202 Perhaps one of the
most important rules she suggests is that, “where hybrid representation is permitted,
the court is still required to ‘obtain a valid waiver of counsel from the defendant.’”203
195 See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 102.
196 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1986).




201 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 101, at 806–09 (discussing the problems involved with
standby counsel).
202 Frigenti, supra note 124, at 1039 (internal citation omitted).
203 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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She goes on to note that, if a pro se defendant “welcomes ‘participation by counsel,
any subsequent participation by counsel is presumed to occur with the defendant’s
approval, unless the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews the request to
proceed without counsel.’”204 Frigenti agrees, as do those states that allow the use
of hybrid representation in the courtroom, that the ultimate decision lies within the
discretion of the trial judge.205
Thus, if a judge wishes to utilize hybrid representation within his courtroom, it
is perhaps prudent for him to be guided by many of the considerations noted above
by other jurisdictions. There are several other potential factors to account for too,
and the remainder of this Note turns to such a focus.
B. Is Hybrid Representation a Good Choice for This Particular Defendant?
As discussed previously, a defendant’s mistrust of the legal system can often
lead them to choose the option of proceeding pro se as the better of two evils.206
Mistrust can stem from a variety of reasons: a defendant may not feel as though his
attorney is fully prepared to proceed with the case due to being overburdened by a
heavy caseload, or the defendant may not have faith in the criminal justice system
after a series of run-ins with the law.207 The pressures public defenders or court-
appointed attorneys feel to reach a plea bargain further exacerbate the problem.208
The defendant “may see the alternatives as no control on the one hand versus guaran-
teed failure on the other.”209 Facing such a dilemma, is it any wonder that many
defendants opt for self-representation?
However, a defendant may also choose to proceed pro se for less legitimate
reasons, such as a desire to disrupt the courtroom and propound their own, often
bizarre, legal theories.210 For example, Sovereign Citizens tend to hit the court sys-
tem hard by filing jumbled and incomprehensible motions which they then utilize
in courts as a means of furthering their case or defense.211 This further impacts the
already backlogged and overburdened courts.212
204 Id. (internal citations omitted).
205 See, e.g., United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 979 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The decision
to allow hybrid representation and to limit the defendant’s participation in such representation
is within the discretion of the trial court.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 958 (1991);
United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The district court has the
authority to allow . . . a hybrid form of representation . . . .” (citation omitted)).
206 See supra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
207 See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 75, at 220.
208 Id.
209 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 119.
210 See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1227.
211 Id. See also Sullivan, supra note 86, at 795–96.
212 See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1228.
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The above two scenarios provide the judge an opportunity to allow for hybrid
representation, particularly as it is within his discretion to allow for such an ap-
proach.213 For example, the judge can offer hybrid representation to a defendant as
a means of shielding the court from the delays and disruptive behavior of pro se
defendants proceeding as some form of protest.214 Working with co-counsel, the
defendant is limited in his chances of disruption and may choose to take on a more
active role fulfilling his part of the bargain. Additionally, this means of control by
the judge can be useful later in the case.215 A defendant who continually disrupts the
ordered proceedings of the court may eventually be precluded from participating at
all in his defense.216 If that proves to be the case, the court is likely to remove the
defendant altogether, ensuring the “dignity, order, and decorum of the courtroom”
is maintained.217 The attorney co-counsel of the hybrid representation can then
continue on his own, advocating for the defendant in the traditional sense but also
ensuring there are no further delays.
In contrast, the judge can also allow a serious defendant to use hybrid represen-
tation as a sword, wielding this approach as a legitimate means of advocacy.218
C. Is the Attorney Willing to Proceed as Co-Counsel to the Defendant?
One of the many concerns countered in the preceding discussion was the idea
that hybrid representation would create chaos and confusion.219 Although rebutted
above, this is a serious consideration when deciding whether to allow a defendant
to utilize hybrid representation in the courtroom. Several issues can arise from the
imposition of this method of defense and should be taken into account by a trial
judge.220 One such problem is a recalcitrant attorney who does not wish to proceed
as co-counsel with the defendant.
It is more than likely that it is within the trial judge’s discretion to impose a dif-
ferent attorney (public defender or court-appointed lawyer) who is willing to work
in a hybrid relationship.221 However, it is also fair to consider that this issue may
213 Colquitt, supra note 33, at 76–77.
214 See Phillips, supra note 14, at 1222–23.
215 See supra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
216 DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 75, at 224. DeFoor includes an analogous discussion
of two cases where the defendant waived his right to counsel to proceed pro se but that de-
cision was later reversed by the court itself for bad behavior. Id. As an example, Defoor quotes
the Second Circuit in its recognition that “an accused’s right to represent himself is not so abso-
lute that it must be recognized when to do so would disrupt the court’s business.” Id. (internal
citations removed).
217 Id.
218 See supra Part II.
219 See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text.
220 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 18, at 859–62 (discussing opposing arguments to hybrid
representation).
221 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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actually resolve itself. A public defender, and very often a court-appointed lawyer,
are paid for by public funds.222 Once appointed, a public defender has a duty to his
client—he must “fulfill the ‘overriding duty of zealous representation . . . .’”223
Moreover, public defenders are greatly overburdened and overworked.224 As a result,
hybrid representation may actually aid the public defender’s workload, but also fall
within their duty to their clients. It is a tricky issue and one which the trial judge is
in the best position to decide.
D. Is There the Potential for Jury Confusion and, If So, How Can That Risk Be
Mitigated?
An oft-cited means against the use of hybrid representation is that of jury con-
fusion.225 The concern is that a jury, not knowing that a defendant has the right to
represent himself, will be confused by a co-counsel relationship and hold it against
the defendant when reaching a verdict.226
There is definitely a wider issue at play here. Many critics, troubled by the jury
system and jury trials, focus on juror competence, “doubting the ability of the average
juror to understand, remember, and integrate all the information (evidence and law)
given to them in modern-day litigation.”227 To that end, other critics have shifted
focus to jury instructions, demonstrating concern with the lack of understanding by
jurors of these judicial instructions.228 Such explorations have called for the rewrit-
ing of instructions to improve comprehensibility and clarity.229
These concerns are noted to highlight that jury confusion is a common issue and
not one solely present when hybrid representation is used. A trial judge, when deciding
whether to allow hybrid representation in his courtroom, can consider the risk of
jury confusion and mitigate this, to a degree, by clear and precise instructions. In the
case of hybrid representation, instructions from the judge can come at two parts of
222 See, e.g., Your Right to a Free Attorney if You are Charged With a Crime, OR. ST. B.,
http://www.osbar.org/public/legalinfo/1078_righttoattorney.htm [https://perma.cc/6SL6-RCMN]
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
223 Harold H. Chen, Note, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective Response
to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783, 792 (1996).
224 See, e.g., Alexa Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who are Too Over-
worked to Defend Them, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked [https://perma.cc
/6PPX-WJJ8].
225 See Williams, supra note 101, at 808.
226 Id.
227 Hon. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L. J. 1229, 1229 (1993). Dann furthers the idea that jurors
should be taking on a more active role thereby ensuring the continued vitality of jury trials
and to keep up with the increasingly complex legal disputes of today’s age. See id. at 1230.
228 See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persis-
tent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (1988).
229 See id. at 77–79.
1338 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1313
the trial: before it begins and before reaching a verdict. The first can be used to inform
the jury.230 A judge can tell the jury that a defendant has the right to represent him-
self231 and in this instance has chosen to proceed with hybrid representation. The
same idea can be reiterated at the end of the trial, to ensure that the defendant’s role
in his defense is not held against him.232 “[E]ducating jurors about what has occurred
in the trial will assist them in reaching a fair verdict.”233
At present, the role of the jury is still considered integral to the American adver-
sarial system.234 There is a “strong sentiment toward . . . the institution of the jury
and its place in the democratic firmament.”235 If we trust juries enough to make deci-
sions, literally, of life and death,236 a trial judge is well within reason to trust a jury
enough to understand hybrid representation.
The four considerations above provide a good starting point in determining
whether the use of hybrid representation should be implemented within a courtroom.
There are further areas to think about too, such as ensuring the protection of the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights in proceeding with hybrid representation. Or, whether
courtroom personnel would benefit from this arrangement, particularly in dealing
with the accompanying paperwork to a trial. These are considerations which a trial
judge can accommodate if considering hybrid representation as a serious alternative.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta paved the way for defendants to have the
constitutional right to self-represent.237 As a result, however, courtrooms across the
nation have faced numerous difficulties, including a defendant’s lack of substantive
knowledge, an increased potential for disruption, and an increased need for intervention
230 See Williams, supra note 101, at 814.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 808.
233 Id. at 814. Here, Williams is discussing instructions to the jury when a defendant has
proceeded pro se, but her concerns are more widely applicable and can be considered if hybrid
representation is utilized. Id. Williams firmly exerts that hybrid representation should not be
allowed in the courtroom and instead, there should be clearer lines separating standby counsel
and the defendant. See id. at 813–14.
234 See Ferguson, supra note 115, at 233.
235 Dann, supra note 227, at 1229.
236 Of course, there is much discussion surrounding juries and capital punishment cases. For
an interesting empirical study, see John H. Blume, An Overview of Significant Findings from the
Capital Jury Project and Other Empirical Studies of the Death Penalty Relevant to Jury Selec-
tion, Presentation of Evidence and Jury Instructions in Capital Cases (2008), http://www.law
school.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-project/resources.cfm [https://perma.cc/95TX-P2S9]
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019). Cornell’s Death Penalty Project focuses on how the death penalty
operates and produces a number of articles related to the death penalty. See About the Death
Penalty Project, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty
-project/about.cfm [https://perma.cc/SZY8-WNAD] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
237 See Decker, supra note 17, at 492.
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from the trial judge to provide guidance for the unwitting pro se litigant.238 Hybrid
representation poses an attractive and efficient solution to such problems and further
provides additional benefits to both the defendant and the court.
As a sword, a defendant can use hybrid representation to present a more favor-
able and advantageous defense. The defendant is often in the best position; he knows
the facts of his case better than anyone in the courtroom.239 Alongside co-counsel,
he can ensure that his defense falls within the trial rules and courtroom proce-
dures.240 Surely, this fits squarely within the constitutional protections afforded by
the Sixth Amendment.
Additionally, hybrid representation can be a means of compromise; the middle
ground between the right to counsel and the right to self-representation.241 It allows
a defendant to utilize a method which encompasses elements of both of these rights
and can be viewed as a better means of proceeding to trial than electing to proceed
pro se. Related to this, hybrid representation thus creates a system that actually has
the potential to practically work.242
Hybrid representation can also be used as a shield, as a means of protection, by the
court. If co-counsel is present, this ensures that the trial judge is freed from any involve-
ment in aiding and assisting the pro se defendant.243 When a trial judge is involved,
this calls into question his discretion and impartiality, two fundamental building-blocks
which the judicial systems tends to rely on.244 In utilizing hybrid representation, no such
questions arise. Furthermore, hybrid representation allows for more control by the
judge.245 It can be used as a pre-emptive strike, preventing a potential loose-cannon
defendant from proceeding pro se and causing long disruptions and delays.246 Addition-
ally, a judge often has some control over the attorney acting as co-counsel and, thus,
via a causal link, has more control over the defendant.247 By exerting this control, a
judge can ensure that a trial proceeds in a manner both judicially correct and effi-
cient. Finally, by utilizing hybrid representation in this manner, a judge can ensure
that the demands on court personnel are reduced when handling complaints, motions,
pleadings, etc.248
The benefits of the shield of hybrid representation do not stop there. It also has
the potential to mitigate a defendant’s mistrust of the judicial system,249 which has
238 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 18, at 855–56 (discussing issues with self-representation).
239 See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
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wider implications in society. By building the trust defendants have in their co-counsel
counterparts, and the courtroom itself, this naturally lends itself to a more efficient
and valued system. Hybrid representation can also lend itself to ensuring justice is
achieved.250 The pro se system currently in place has many difficulties and essen-
tially allows a defendant to “[c]rash and [b]urn.”251 It is safe to assume that this is
not what the Faretta court had in mind when it passed down its decision.252 How-
ever, that is unfortunately the current reality. Hybrid representation at least provides
a potential solution.
There are many further considerations to hybrid representation that have not
been included within the discussion of this Note. For example, malpractice liability
would need some thought. If an attorney is acting as co-counsel, where does the line
of insurance fall? Consequently, this Note does not contend that hybrid representa-
tion is the best solution and should be immediately implemented into courts across
the country. Rather, this Note proposes that hybrid representation should be given
its due as a potential alternative.
Although there is no constitutional guarantee for hybrid representation, it is within
the trial judge’s discretion to allow a defendant to proceed in such a manner. As with
anything, hybrid representation has its pros and cons, but in the right situation, at the
right time, hybrid representation could be an effective and positive means to an end.
“Justice may well require that balances be struck and reasonable procedural accom-
modations fashioned.”253 Hybrid representation may just be that balance.
250 See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
251 Frigenti, supra note 124, at 1019.
252 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
253 United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st Cir. 1989).
